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Girma Kebbede
SUDAN: THE NORTH-SOUTH
CONFLICT IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
T HE PEOPLES of southern Sudan have suffered nearly two centuries ofcolonial rule under the Turko-Egyptian, the Mahdiya, the Anglo-Egyptian, and the post-independence northern regimes. There is little
need to repeat yet again this rather long history. Attention is only called here
to the activities and policies of these colonial regimes which have contributed
to the cleavage between the predominantly Muslim North and non-Muslim
South.
The history ofthe Islamic conquest and Arabization ofnorthern Sudan
was a gradual and incremental process. From the seventh century on, Arab
invaders from Egypt moved southward to the richer lands beyond the inhospi-
table Nubian expanse and forced deals on local rulers who undertook to assist
Arab merchants financially and allow the preaching ofIslam. Many ofthe Arabs
settled among the sedentary riverian communities in Sudan, taking up cultiva-
tion on the fertile alluvial soil. Others moved westward into the savanna regions
of what is today known as Darfur and Kordofan and became cattle keepers.
Wherever they settled, the Arabs blended with the local cultures, intermarried
freely with the different Mrican indigenous inhabitants, and gradually intro-
duced Islam and the Arab culture. Some indigenous tribes, like the Nuba of
Kordofan, the Fur of Darfur, and the Beja of the Red Sea Hills, resisted Arab
incursion into their respective homeland. In due time, however, they suc-
cumbed to the force ofthe new invaders and accepted Islam and learnt to speak
Arabic, but retained their languages and cultures. Staunch resisters were killed,
enslaved or fled elsewhere. By the fourteenth century much ofnorthern Sudan
was transformed into an overwhelmingly Arabized and Islamized society and
three Muslim states had emerged: Sennar on the Blue Nile; Kordofan in the
middle, west of the White Nile; and Darfur to the west. The Arab penetration
deep into southern Sudan did not occur until the early nineteenth century.
CONTRIBUTIONS IN BLACK STUDIES 15 (1997):15-45
1
Kebbede: Sudan: The North-South Conflict in Historical Perspective
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1997
16 Girma Kebbede
Until then, protected by rivers, swamps and mountains the peoples ofsouthern
Sudan had very little contact with northern Sudan-or the outside world for
that matter.
Sudan's North-South conflict owes its genesis to the colonial past. Like
many territorial demarcations in the continent, Sudan's present borderlines
were defined by the colonial powers at the turn of the century. As a political
entity, then, Sudan-like many African countries-is a fairly recent creation.
Sudan's ethnically and religiously diverse people were brought together for the
first time under a centralized government and administration during the Turko-
Egyptian colonial rule (Beshir, 1984: 10) which lasted from 1820 to 1882. With
full control over much ofthe northern halfofthe country, The Turko-Egyptian
rulers slowly penetrated the non-Islamic and non-Arab South, establishing
trade routes and eventually securing, roughly, the present day borders ofSudan.
The Turko-Egyptian colonial rule was a brutal one for the South, for
it promoted the slave trade. Even before the Turko-Egyptian occupation,
southern Sudan had become a source of slaves and ivory. The ]ellaba (the
urbanized Arab trading class) and their organized militia armies had already
been pillaging the South, extracting tens ofthousands ofslaves long before the
region was brought under direct foreign control. Under the Turko-Egyptian
rule the slave trade became a state activity and became rampant and widespread,
extending far into the South, the Nuba mountains, and southern Darfur
(Beshir, 1984: 13). The trade reached its height in the late nineteenth century
when it was estimated that about two million southern Sudanese, predomi-
nantly from the Dinka country, were "enslaved and sold like cheap commodi-
ties" by Arab, European, Egyptian, and Turkish traders (Salih, 1994: 194).
The Turko-Egyptian occupation ended in 1882 when the northern
Sudanese revolted under the leadership of Mohammed Ahmed ibn al-Sayyid
Abdallah, who called himself the Mahdi, meaning holy savior or redeemer, of
the Sudan. The British, having occupied Egypt in 1882, intervened militarily
but were unable to stifle the rise of the Mahdi. In 1885 the Mahdi forces
occupied Khartoum, defeated the troops of British General Charles Gordon,
established Sudan's first theocratic state and used Islam as a unifYing force. The
rule ofthe Mahdi was no less brutal for the inhabitants ofsouthern Sudan. The
slave trade continued with greater vigor. The Arabic language and Islam were
imposed on the South by force and violence. The Holy Law of Islam, or the
Shari'a, became the law ofthe land. Southern resistance was successfully quelled
with the help of firearms captured from the defeated Turko-Egyptian army.
The existence of an independent Mahdi state threatened the British
plan to bring the entire stretch ofterritory from Cairo to Cape Town under their
rule. In 1898, the Mahdi state fell to the Anglo-Egyptian occupation forces. For
more than halfa century, Sudan became a British colony in reality, even though
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it was known as the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Within the first two decades most
ofthe country's border was defined and nearly all the territory oftoday's Sudan
came under the firm control of Britain. The British built railroads to link
important areas of economic interest and along the White Nile to control the
Upper Nile. Schools were opened in Khartoum and a few major urban areas for
children ofwell-to-do families and colonial civil servants. Large irrigation and
mechanized rainfed agricultural schemes were established to produce commer-
cial crops for export. Almost all the economic infrastructure and development
projects were concentrated in the agriculturally endowed north-central region.
Very few economic, social, and administrative structures were built in the
South.
The North-South geographical division was instituted in 1922 when
the British adopted a separate system of administration in Sudan's southern
region consisting ofthe provinces ofEquatoria, Bahr el Ghazal, and Upper Nile.
Administratively, the three provinces were segregated until 1947, and were
largely ignored in terms of social and economic development. The few social
services such as schools and clinics that were available were provided by
Christian missionaries for the most part. The "Southern Policy" severed
virtually all relations between the northern and southern regions. The law
barred northern Sudanese from entering or living in the South, and even those
northerners-especially Arab merchants-who had lived in the region for years
were forced to leave. Native southerners were also prohibited to travel or seek
employment in the North. The spread of the Arabic language and Islam was
disallowed in the region, while Christianity and the English language were
encouraged (Deng and Gifford, 1987: 15-16). The British abolished and
undermined the powerful Arab slave lords and dealers. The detachment ofthe
South from the rest of Sudan and the imposition of a separate system of
administration served vital British colonial interests: to prevent Arab and
Muslim influence from spreading, to prepare the southern region for its
"eventual integration with British East African" Federation (Nelson, 1983:
40), and to control the sources along the length of the Nile.
Pressured by a growing Sudanese nationalist movement in the North,
Britain reversed its "Southern Policy" a decade or so before granting Sudan
independence. The British nullified all restrictions imposed to separate the
southern region from the North and met the northerners' demands for a united
Sudan. Movement between the two regions was allowed. Northerners were
permitted to return to their administrative posts in the South, and Arabic was
imposed as the only official language of administration, replacing English.
Arabic was also introduced as a school subject. The interdiction against Muslim
preaching in the South was annulled (Nelson, 1983: 44). Within a briefperiod
of time the northern Arabs overwhelmed the region. They managed to
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monopolize all the major institutions such as the civil service, finance and
banking, education, and security-in the South.
Inevitably, southerners opposed the reversal of this policy that re-
imposed northern domination, fearing that slavery would return and a united
Sudan would jeopardize their cultural and political rights. All along the
southerners knew that northern nationalist leaders had always asserted that the
objective oftheir struggle was not only to free Sudan from foreign domination
but also to "establish an Islamic Arab culture" in the entire country (Markakis,
1987: 71-72). The negotiations on self-determination of the country in the
early 1950s proved southern fears of northern domination. The northern
nationalists excluded the southerners from the negotiations. They also reneged
on their pre-independence promise to create a federal system ofrelationship-
as opposed to a centralized system-between the northern and the southern
regions. These and other subsequent measures taken against the South soon led
to the development of a secessionist armed struggle. The movement began in
1955, a few months before independence, when Equatoria Corps in Torit
mutinied. However, full-fledged armed activities did not occur until 1962 when
the Sudan Mrican National Union organized a guerrilla army known as the
Anyanya.
The northern elite leaders ofthe newly independent Sudan vigorously
pursued the process of Arabization and Islamization of southern Sudan with
little or no regard to the interests of the non-Arab and non-Islamic peoples of
the region. The central government, especially during the Abboud military
regime (1958-1964), adopted and put in practice policies that undermined the
identity, cultures, and customs of the South. The government despised
indigenous beliefs and cultural practices and took forceful actions to suppress
them. It imposed Islam and Arabic by force. It declared Friday as the weekly day
of religious observance and rest. It closed mission schools and restricted
Christian missionaries and later expelled them from the country. The govern-
ment also gave all major regional government posts to northern Sudanese. A
statement by the first Minister of the Interior of the first independence
government summarized this state ofaffairs when he declared in parliament that
"Sudan is an Arab country and whoever does not feel Arab should quit" (Deng
and Gifford, 1987: 16). All this, inevitably, resulted in the acceleration of a
secessionist war in the South. The Anyanya guerrilla forces spread the war
throughout the southern region. In the late 1960s, Joseph Lagu, a former
lieutenant, brought disparate guerrilla groups together to form a credible
armed front known as the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement.
The civilian governments that followed the Abboud military regime
continued to follow more or less the same policies pursued by the governments
before them. They also made no secret of their desire to Islamize the whole
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country and beyond. Sadig el Mahdi, who became Prime Minister in 1966,
reiterated Sudan's future by declaring that "Islam has a holy mission in Mrica
and southern Sudan is the beginning of that mission" (Malwal, 1981: 41). In
a speech to the National Assembly he again declared: "the dominant feature of
our nation is an Islamic one and its overpowering expression is Arab, and this
nation will not have its entity identified and its prestige and pride preserved
except under an Islamic revival" (Markakis, 1987: 72).
The civilian regimes' inability and unwillingness to resolve the political
crisis in the South and their failure to deal with the country's economic
problems resulted in a growing discontent of the populace. This situation
provided the army an excuse to seize political power once again. In May 1969,
a small group ofyoung officers led by Colonel Jaafar Nimeiri took over power
in a bloodless coup and constituted themselves as the Revolutionary Command
Council (RCC). Allied with the Communist Party and the trade unions, the
Nimeiri regime "portrayed itself as a government of the progressive forces,
whose ultimate goal was the liberation of Sudan from dependency, and the
adoption of the non-capitalist path of development" (Kurita, 1994: 210) or
"Sudanese Socialism." The regime dissolved all traditional political parties,
suspended the existing constitution, and took steps to reduce and eventually
eradicate the economic power of the religious sects and to undermine their
social base. The regime also established a single state party-the Sudanese
Socialist Union-nationalized basic economic sectors, and took upon itselfthe
task offormulating strategies for social and economic development. By moving
the country into the Soviet orbit, the regime acquired Soviet weapons and
instructors and adopted a pro-Soviet alignment at the United Nations and other
international fora.
Nimeiri's flirtation with the socialist ideology, his marriage of conve-
nience with the communists, and his pro-Soviet stance did not last long. In July
of 1971, the communists-allied with discontented army officers-attempted
to oust him in a coup that almost succeeded. After the aborted coup, Nimeiri
purged the communists and their sympathizers from his government and
executed or imprisoned many ofthem. Soon after, he abandoned his so-called
socialist path of development and shifted to the free enterprise system.
Nimeiri took another dramatic action to end the southern civil war. He
realized that neither the government armed forces nor the Anyanya guerrillas
were able to achieve a victory after seventeen years ofbloody encounters. At that
point, the war had displaced about 2 million southerners and took the lives of
a million. Nimeiri opted to resolve the problem through political negotiations.
Ending the war was also advantageous for this would strengthen his political
power base. In 1972, high-level delegates from both the Sudanese government
and the guerrilla forces met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and after a series of
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negotiations agreed to end the war. The Addis Ababa Agreement gave the
South a large measure ofregional autonomy, allowing the region to have its own
elected assembly and executive body that would be responsible for most matters
except external affairs, national defense and national planning. It stipulated that
the southern boundaries be "as they stood" the day Sudan became indepen-
dent. It recognized the southern religious beliefs, languages and traditional
laws, and asserted the equality between "Islam, Christianity and indigenous
traditional beliefs as religions of the people of the Sudan" (Beshir, 1984: 27).
The agreement also pledged to re-integrate the Anyanya guerrilla fighters into
the national defense forces, to resettle and rehabilitate people dislocated by the
war, and to create better conditions for development opportunities (Deng,
1987: 389-390).
The accord seemed unfeigned. Nimeiri himself declared to his nation
that he "recognizes the historical and cultural differences between the North
and the South and believes that the unity of our country must be built upon
these objective realities. The southern people have the right to develop their
respective cultures and traditions in a united southern Sudan" (Beshir, 1984:
27). Indeed, the creation of a single southern region gave its people a greater
sense ofrepresentation and a better prospect ofparticipating in the affairs ofthe
country than they had previously. The Addis Ababa Agreement was the most
important event in the political history ofpost-independence Sudan. It under-
scored that national unity is possible in diversity. Nimeiri was justifiably given
much credit for acceding to important southern demands.
Sudan enjoyed a period of relative peace and stability in the decade of
the 1970s. Nimeiri vanquished his former communist allies and shifted from his
earlier Soviet disposition to alignment with the Western world and conservative
Arab countries. The country was able to lure considerable foreign investment
loans from the Western governments and banks and the multilateral finance
institutions. The idea ofturning Sudan into the breadbasket ofthe Middle East
gained acceptance and attracted substantial investment from the oil-rich Arab
countries, thanks to the oil boom ofthe early 1970s. Sudan received the largest
US economic and military aid in Africa after Egypt for its support ofthe Camp
David accords between Egypt and Israel in the late 1970s. Together interna-
tionallenders "poured more than $2 billion into Sudan's agriculture" between
1975 and 1985 (Voll, 1991: 137). Nearly all the investment in agriculture in
1970s occurred in the northern region.
By the end of the 1970s, however, Nimeiri's popularity began to
languish as the country's economic situation-exacerbated by the world
recession, hiking oil prices, and mismanagement and corruption-deteriorated.
As the economic crisis came to a head, the IMF intervened and imposed
austerity measures (currency devaluation, reducing subsidies, lifting price
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controls, increasing cash crop exports, raising interest rates, freezing wages,
liberalization of trade). In the South dissatisfaction escalated as people found
themselves in a more pitiful situation socially and economically than they were
before the Addis Ababa accord. In spite of relative peace and stability, poverty,
disease, and illiteracy remained the lot of the vast majority of the southern
population. Many southerners had hopes for their region's economic and social
development. However, no meaningful economic development took place in
the region after the restoration of peace. Although southern Sudan possesses
considerable wealth in agriculture, livestock, and minerals, the Nimeiri govern-
ment failed to pay signifIcant attention to the social and economic development
needs of the region. The number ofprimary schools increased somewhat, but
most lacked adequate facilities and teachers. The central government planned
a number ofdevelopment projects for the South but failed to implement most
of them. For instance, some of the unrealized projects included Nzara and
Mongalla textiles, Malakal paper industry, Wau brewery, Tonj Kenaf, Melut and
Mongalla sugar projects, Kapoeta cement factory, and Beden electric plant
(Garang, 1984: 31). The few projects that the government helped implement
failed because of poor planning and inadequate infrastructural support. Some
projects were not completed, not because of lack of funding, but because the
central government attempted to deny the South any substantial benefits. Two
such projects are the Jonglei canal water project and the oil exploration project
in Bentiu.
As Nimeiri's support in both the North and the South deteriorated, he
sought to make alliance with northern opposition parties and the powerful
Muslim Brotherhood. This opportunistic political marriage with old foes-
especially with the Muslim Brotherhood, the most contumacious opponent of
the southern Sudanese demand for self-determination-further alienated the
South and tensions began to escalate. In the early 1980s, the twilight ofhis rule,
Nimeiri made a series of blunders that led to the undoing of his most notable
accomplishment-peace between North and South.
Extraction of Oil
In 1979, US-based Chevron company discovered signifIcant oil re-
serves-estimated at 5 billion barrels-in Bentiu District of Upper Nile
(Mawson, 1984): 522). Soon after the discovery, the Nimeiri government
attempted to deny the South ownership of this precious resource. At first, the
government tried unsuccessfully to redraw the boundaries between North and
South so that the oil reserves fell within the territorial jurisdiction ofthe North
(Bennett, 1987: 71). This was contrary to the Addis Ababa Agreement that
recognized the southern boundaries inherited from the colonial rule. After the
annexation attempt failed, the government came up with another plan-to
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refine the crude oil at a different site than where it was found. At first it wanted
to ship the crude oil to a refinery to be constructed at Kosti in the White Nile
Province in the north. A while later, it dropped this idea in favor ofpipe lining
the crude oil from Bentiu to Port Sudan on the Red Sea for export. As expected,
the South-which wanted the oil refined where it was located-vehemently
opposed the measure. The South became convinced that the central govern-
ment intended to plunder the newly discovered oil reserves for the benefit ofthe
North with the South standing to gain very little.
Withdrawal of Water from the Sudd
Another key issue ofcontention between the Nimeiri government and
the South was the use ofand control over the upper Nile water. For years, Sudan
and Egypt had been planning to increase the total discharge of the White Nile
by constructing a 360-mile canal between Jonglei and Malakal-bypassing the
Sudd, where an estimated 60 percent ofthe water (about 31,000 million cubic
meters per year) is lost through evaporation. Once it was completed, the
estimation was that the canal would be able to carry half the amount ofwater
flowing into the Sudd and deliver it-with some loss to evaporation-to the
White Nile at Malakal. The project would have solved the two countries' biggest
water problem, especially during the dry season, and it would have significantly
augmented the amount of cultivable land. The need for additional water
resources has become particularly crucial for Egypt as it has reached its
maximum share of the Nile water apportioned by the Nile Waters Agreement
ofl959. Egypt has put the water from the Aswam high Dam to the maximum
possible use. Sudan also anticipated much gain from this gigantic water project.
The construction of the canal not only increases water availability but also
creates possibilities to open-up the wooded savanna area outside the central clay
region for further exploitation for mechanized farming. In the latter halfofthe
1970s, the government was already pushing mechanized farming southwards
into the Ingessena region in southern Blue Nile province, the Nuba mountains
in southern Kordofan, and in northern Upper Nile and Bahr al-Ghazal. With
the completion of the canal and drying out of the swamp, turning the Sudd
region-which is extremely vital to southern pastoralists-into mechanized
farms, was in the government's long-term development plan. The government's
plan was expected to "reclaim 300,000 feddans ofland in the west bank of the
river in its first stage of development, and possibly 3.7 million feddans in the
long term" (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1995-96: 17).
The Nimeiri government gave a green light to the excavation of the
canal and work began in 1977. The canal was expected to be completed
sometime during the mid-1980s and an additional 4.75 billion cubic meters of
water would have been available for irrigation in northern Sudan and Egypt.
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(The Economist Intelligence Unit, 95-96: 17). However, the project provoked
massive resentment in the South, where it was feared that draining the Sudd
would not only have deleterious environmental consequences, but also ignored
the economic interests ofthe South. The Nimeiri government neither involved
the participation ofsoutherners in the decision making process nor considered
the ramification ofthe project on the livelihood ofthe inhabitants ofthe region.
Had the canal been completed, it would have deprived the inhabitants-the
Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk-of dry-season grazing for their herds and, as a
consequence, would have possibly forced them to alter their way oflife. In the
first few months of the resumption of the war, the southern guerrilla army
successfully forced a halt to the construction of the canal, with a little less than
a third of the project left unfinished.
Land Expropriation
The South is endowed with vast agricultural land. Reliable rains make
the region suitable for the cultivation a variety of crops including sorghum,
millet, maize, groundnuts, and sesame. As the state exhausted vast tracts ofthe
fertile savanna plains of central and eastern regions, it began to promote the
expansion oflarge-scale mechanized farming in the southern region, particu-
larly in the northern parts of Upper Nile province and in the Nuba country of
southern Kordofan. The expansion ofmechanized farming in these regions was
done by expropriating land belonging to the indigenous farming and pastoralist
population. As more and more native populations were squeezed off their
grazing and farm lands, resentment and hostilities grew. Even before the
SPLM/A started its armed struggle in 1983, people opposed to this encroach-
ment had already began attacking and burning mechanized-farming schemes.
Ending Southern Autonomy
In 1983 Nimeiri abolished the legally elected regional government and
assembly in Juba and duly decreed the South subdivided into three political
regions (each with a Nimeiri appointed governor), ending the special status
accorded to it by the Addis Ababa Agreement as a single autonomous region.
This decree not only capriciously broke the Addis Ababa Agreement, but also
proclaimed that henceforth Arabic would be the exclusive official language of
the whole country. Several southerners opposed to subdivision were incarcer-
ated or threatened with their lives. Government troops were dispatched to
major Southern cities and garrison towns to quell growing spontaneous as well
as organized opposition to subdivision. Those who supported subdivision-
many ofwhom were non-Dinka southern elites-were rewarded with political
posts and material largesse. It was a prurient effort to 'divide and rule' the region
"whereby southern leaders and geographical regions were played off against
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each other whilst the north remained in control" (Bennett, 1987: 69-70).
Indeed, prompted by Dinka overrepresentation and supremacy in the
larger regional government and alleged diversion ofresources and development
funds out ofEquatoria to other areas of the region, some non-Dinka southern
leaders, particularly Equatorians, went along with the move to subdivide the
region. Nimeiri's vice-president, Joseph Lagu, the one-time leader of the
Anyanya guerrillas in the south, had called tor the subdivision of the southern
region into three individual provinces, hoping that Equatorians would have
control of their own ethnically 'homogeneous' political unit. As a non-Dinka,
he had been unable to dominate the southern regional government during his
time as its leader. The southern regional assembly, however, saw the plan as a
measure intended to enfeeble the political strength ofa united South and voted
decisively against the proposed subdivision (Salih, 1994: 195-196). Even those
Equatorians who all along resented Dinka political and economic domination
and aspired to establish their own self-government were not willing to accept
the complete dissolution of a united autonomous southern political body.
In the 1982 and more so in 1983, as more government troops were
brought to the South, disparate armed uprising had broken out in various parts
of the South, particularly in Abyei in Kordotan, Bentiu district where oil fields
were found, Aiwel and Rumbek in Bahr el Ghazal, and Nasir in Upper Nile.
Thousands ofsouthern troops stationed in Pibor, Bor, Pochalla and in a number
southern garrisons refused to be deployed in the North and joined one ofseveral
armed groups. Under the 1972 agreement 6,000 Anyanya guerrillas were to be
absorbed into the national army and to be stationed in the South. The fear that
these forces might rebel against him prompted Nimeiri's decision in 1983 to
transfer them to the North. In 1983 opposition forces in the region rallied
around Colonel Dr. John Garang de Mabior, a Dinka-the South's largest
tribe-to form the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and its military wing
the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/A, from here on). Sudan's second
civil war commenced.
Imposition of Shari'a Laws
The final rebuke to the southern people came in September 1983 when
Nimeiri-with the blessing of the Islamic Sufi sect-imposed his infamous
Shari'a Islamic Laws on the whole population of the country-Muslims,
Christians, and adherents of indigenous African beliefs alike. Neither the
People's Assembly nor Nimeiri's own political party, the Sudan Socialist Union,
was involved in the promulgation ofthese so-called September Laws. The new
laws broke the secular constitution and reversed the commitment to equal
rights for women and men, and tor all Sudanese religious groups. The laws were
put to practice almost immediately with the establishment ofthe Shari'a courts.
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These courts were nothing but a military justice, with a lacquer of Islamic
ostentation. The first and most frequent victims of this cruel punishment were
overwhelmingly the urban poor, especially the non-Arab and non-Muslim
destitutes from the South, Darfur and the Nuba Mountains. Many northern
Muslims were outraged at the imposition of Shari'a whose violators were
subjected to gross forms ofpunishment including hanging, flogging, stoning,
and amputation of limbs. Those who were opposed to the institution of the
Shari'a Laws were either imprisoned or executed. Among those who were
executed was former University of Khartoum law professor Ustaz (Teacher)
Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, one ofSudan's well-respected and acknowledged
educators and Islamic thinkers. By the time the Shari'a Laws became the law of
the land, several battles had already been fought between government troops
and the SPLM/A, and the decrees essentially destroyed any chance of north-
south reconciliation.
Nimeiri's last five years or so experienced a rapid downturn of the
economy and the deterioration of the standard ofliving of the vast majority of
citizens. The country's exports were performing so poorly that they were paying
for much less than half of the imports. By 1985 Sudan's total external debt at
$11 billion had exceeded the country's entire gross domestic product for that
year. The payment to service the debt alone consumed nearly all ofthe country's
export earning. The debt had been incurred to fund massive irrigation projects
in the 1970s, to buy chemical fertilizers, pesticides and machinery. The civil war
had already erupted again in the South-after eleven year interlude-and was
causing widespread famine, death and dislocation.
Deteriorating living conditions in rural areas such as Darfur, the Nuba
Mountains and the South caused an influx of hundreds of thousands of
impoverished people into urban areas, especially the national capital, Khartoum
where they constituted a class ofthe unemployed and the homeless, known as
shammasa. These people became not only victims of Nimeiri's Islamic penal
code but also became the target of his other infamous policy known as kasha,
the forceful eviction of rural immigrants from their own national capital and
sending them back to their place of origin. In 1984, thousands of poor
immigrants were indiscriminately picked up from the streets of Khartoum by
security forces and sent back to where they were presumed to have come from
or damped in the periphery ofthe capital or relocated in several sites near major
mechanized agricultural schemes in eastern and central regions.
Sudan, like Ethiopia, also suffered from drought and famine. During
the first ofthe 198Os, the rains failed in much ofthe northern halfofthe country,
stretching right across the country from the north-west to the northeast,
including Darfur (North and South), Kordofan and the Red Sea hills. For four
years, from 1982 to 1986, harvests were poor and food was scarce. Output for
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staple crops like millet and sorghum fell by 38 and 58 percent, respectively, in
1982 and 1983 and continued to fall in 1984 (Richards and Waterbury, 1990:
143) and 1985 as well. Grain prices skyrocketed. The drought wiped out
animals. In Northern Kordofan, for instance, the Kababish camel-breeders,
once the most wealthy traders who sold camels as far away as northern Nigeria
and Egypt, lost all their herds. The Beja nomads lost nine-tenth of their
livestock. Overall, as many as ten million Sudanese lives were endangered, the
largest famine-affected population in Africa during this period. The country had
practically no food reserves to fall back on. Nearly 2 million rural Sudanese were
forced from their homes, moving into the Nile valley or further south to less
severely affecting areas or to urban areas in search of food.
Signs of impending disaster in these regions were seen after the poor
harvests of 1982 and 1983. However, the initial response of the Nimeiri
government was one ofcallous indifference. The government felt that acknowl-
edging the existence of famine would be politically damaging and possibly
undermine its effort to entice foreign investors. It was only after tens of
thousands of refugees trekked to the capital and in response to internal and
external pressure that the government was forced to disclose the disaster and to
deliver relief supplies to the famine-stricken regions and initiate rehabilitation
programs for the famine-displaced population. Moreover, the government's
initial refusal to admit the famine crisis delayed much needed reliefaid from the
international community, causing too many unnecessary deaths and displace-
ment.
Many of the people in the capital city Khartoum, and its twin cities,
Omdurman and Khartoum North, were not spared from the impact ofdrought
and famine in the countryside. The poor and low-income civil servants on fixed
income suffered immensely because food prices and the cost of other basic
necessities skyrocketed beyond what average families could afford. They had to
spend an inordinate amount of time on queues to obtain their daily ration of
kisra (the staple sorghum bread). The lifting of petrol and food subsidies
demanded by the International Monetary Fund also exacerbated the situation.
In April 1985 a series of strikes and demonstrations by workers, civil
servants, petty traders, students, and the unemployed prompted the upper
echelons ofthe military to remove Nimeiri from power. After a briefperiod of
transitional military rule, parliamentary elections were held in 1986 and the
Umma Party won 99 seats (less than a majority), while the Democratic Unionist
Party won 64. The parliament appointed the Umma Party's leader, Sadiq al-
Mahdi, to form a new government. Mahdi succeeded in forming a coalition
government and became Prime Minister for the second time. Sudan seemed to
be moving in the direction ofdemocracy. There were political parties, indepen-
dent trade unions, human rights organizations, independent newspapers, and
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tolerance for anti-government expression. The parliament revoked Nimeiri's
subdivision of the South. There was great expectation that Mahdi would seek
a political solution to end the protracted civil war and suspend the controversial
Shari'a laws. Mahdi himselfcampaigned on peaceful resolution ofthe civil war
and repeals ofthe Shari'a Laws. Immediately after his election, he met with John
Garang, the SPLM/A leader, and proposed a peace plan that included the
abrogation of the Shari'a Laws, one of the main obstacles to peace.
To the disappointment of many, however, Mahdi suddenly backed
down from his promises to disavow the Shari'a Laws. The National Islamic
Front (NIF) and its leader Dr. Hassan al-Turabi (the brother-in-law ofMahdi)
had much to do with Mahdi's change ofmind. Dr. Turabi was, and still is, the
chiefadvocate of the Shari'a Laws and the most hucksterish in his quest of the
war in the South. Sadiq al-Mahdi's resolve to institute some type ofthe Islamic
penal code-despite its unpopularity with many northern and all southern
Sudanese-became increasingly indubitable. In the end Mahdi found himself
closer to the NIP's religious and political ideology than to the Democratic
Unionist Party (DUP), his major coalition partner. The DUP left the coalition
government after both the Prime Minister and the Parliament rejected the
Party's peace initiatives to end the civil war. The DUP leader, Mohamed Osman
al-Mirghani, had negotiated a peace agreement with the SPLM/A leader, John
Garang, in November 1988 in Koka Dam, Ethiopia. The agreement had called
for an immediate cease-fire, a convening of a constitutional conference, a
reprieve ofthe Shari'a Laws, the creation ofan interim government ofnational
unity that would include the SPLM/A, and the termination ofSudan's military
pacts with Libya and Egypt. This accord had been supported by the Army, trade
unions and all political parties except Mahdi's party, the Umma and Turabi's
Party, the NIF.
Thus Sadiq el-Mahdi proved to be a complete disappointment during
his three year tenure as the leader of the first democratic in over 16 years. He
not only failed to bring political settlement to the civil war, but exacerbated it
by arming Muslim Arabic speaking tribal militias (the Missiriya, the Riziygat,
and the Ma'aliya, for instance) in Southern Kordofan and Southern Darfur
Provinces-especially in areas bordering SPLM/A's strongholds-to fight the
rebels. These were areas where there had been historic enmities between Arabic
speaking settlers and southern tribes. Armed with modern weapons the Arab
militias carried out, instead of engaging the SPLM/A, destructive activities
against southern non-Arab communities. They burned villages, killed innocent
civilians, raided cattle, and kidnapped young boys and girls to sell them as slaves
in the North. In most instances, these roving militias committed these atrocities
with the full knowledge and support of the government army and local
authorities. The Dinka civilians were, and still are, the main victims of these
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destructive forces. The government's supply ofarms is not only confined to the
Muslim Arabic speaking tribes; it has also armed (true to its divide and rule
policy) rival southern tribes-for instance, the Murle, the Mandari, the Bari, and
the Didinga-who view the SPLM/A as a threat.
The Mahdi government continued the war with vigor, believing
military force would bring the SPLM/A to its knees. Sudan received military
weapons from neighboring Libya, as well as from some other Arab countries.
The government had already characterized the North-South conflict as Arab
versus non-Arab war to arouse the sentiment of the Arab World and gain
material support for the war. When the SPLM/A attacked Ed Damazin in the
Blue Nile Province in 1988, Mahdi told the Arab world: "The Arab soil has been
invaded from the South." In spite ofall this, the war went badly for the Sudanese
Army and by the late 1980s the SPLM/A forces managed to control several
government garrison towns and most of the vast countryside in the three
southern provinces. Army leaders openly admitted that force cannot win the
war, and General Khalil, the Minister ofDefense, resigned to protest the Prime
Minister's refusal to accept the peace agreement negotiated by the DUP. The
war forced millions of southerners to flee the South and into Ethiopia,
thousands of them dying of starvation along the way.
Rise of the National Islamic Front
and the Escalation of the War
The historical roots ofthe Islamic movement or Muslim Brotherhood
began in Egypt in the late 1920s under the leadership ofHassan al Banna. The
movement later spread to other Arab countries, including Sudan, in the 1930s
and 1940s. (Gurdon, 1984: 68). The Brotherhood started as a challenge to the
Western political, economic and cultural domination. The members ofthe early
Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan were primarily students. Many of them were
family members of well-known religious sects. In the 1940s and 1950s, the
movement acted as a pressure group to insure the post-independence constitu-
tion conformed with Islamic principles. In the 1960s, the young Dr. Hassan al-
Turabi transformed the movement into a new political force with the formation
of the Islamic Charter Front (ICF). The ICF, though numerically small,
continued to pressure the two largest political parties-whose social base was
derived primarily from their affiliation with religious orders-to support the
adoption of an Islamic constitution. Most importantly, with Dr. Turabi's
charismatic leadership, the ICF charted a long-term strategy aimed at broaden-
ing its social base and to undertake mass ideological work in various private and
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public institutions. In the late 1960s, however, the political and social influence
ofthe Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamic Charter Front came to a halt when
Nimeiri seized political power and disbanded all political parties.
The Muslim Brothers, like other opposition political forces in the
country, went underground throughout much of the 1970s. Many of the
political leaders, including Dr. Turabi, were forced to go into exile. However,
its fortune reversed for good in the late 1970s when President Nimeiri, faced
with economic and political crises, pursued a policy of accommodation and
reconciliation with his political opponents. This rapprochement allowed the
return of Dr. Turabi from exile in 1977. Soon after his return, Dr. Turabi and
his movement seized this opportunity to rebuild their political organization.
During Nimeiri's final years, the movement worked closely with the govern-
ment and acquired influential government posts for many of its well-educated
members. During this period, the movement acquired a strong bureaucratic
experience and built its financial portfolio by establishing a close link with the
Saudi-funded Faisal Islamic Bank and other financial institutions in the country.
The post-Nimeiri political environment provided the opportunity for
the Islamic forces to consolidate and become a formidable political force. This
force culminated in the formation ofthe National Islamic Front (NIF) Uabbatu
Islamiyyah al Qawimiyyah] with Dr. Turabi as its unquestionable leader.
Although it finished third behind the Mahdist U mma Party and the Democratic
Unionist Party in the 1986 national democratic elections-taking nearly a fifth
ofthe seats in the National Assembly-the NIF emerged as a dominant political
force to be reckoned with.
In the ensuing three years of the al-Mahdi administration, the NIF
managed to place many of its highly educated members throughout the
administrative structures and the ranks of the military and intelligence organi-
zations. Its highly devoted and disciplined young cadres gained control over the
various cultural institutions such as educational, religious, labor, and welfare
organizations. Its membership increased significantly to include many profes-
sionals in academics, doctors, lawyers, merchants, bankers, small businessmen,
military officers, students, and civil servants. It built a financial empire by
gaining control over the banking institutions, the media, the construction and
transport sectors through the Islamic Banks. * With these newly acquired
political bases, financial power, and efficient organization, it moved to domi-
nate the new post-Nimeiri political arena. In the Parliament, it successfully
blocked several legislative attempts designed to repeal the controversial Islamic
Laws promulgated by Nimeiri.
* The key to its financial success is that as religious institutions the Islamic banks are exempt
from central bank supervision, all taxation, and have preferential access to government
licenses and export credits (O'Brien, 1989: 34).
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Towards the end of the 1980s the country's economy suffered enor-
mously from the crippling consequences of a $14 billion foreign debt-well
over halfaccumulating in less than four years ofthe Mahdi regime with very little
to show for it by way of development accomplishments-and from the heavy
cost ofthe war, estimated to have consumed over 2S percent ofthe government's
budget. Sadiq al-Mahdi and his coalition partners were more preoccupied with
their own political gains and losses and with Islamic future of the nation than
with the civil war and other pressing problems facing the country. Finally, on
June 30,1989, a group ofIslamic officers, backed and encouraged by the NIF,
overthrew the democratically elected government ofSadiq al-Mahdi.
Lieutenant-General Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir and his IS-mem-
ber Revolutionary Command Council of National Salvation (RCC) led the
post-Mahdi Islamic government. Following the coup, the RCC suspended the
1986 transitional constitution, closed down independent papers, banned all
political parties, human rights organizations, and trade unions and confiscated
their properties, and imprisoned their top leaders. It forced over 3,000 army
officers out of their jobs for their non-support of the imposition of the Shari'a
Laws and for pushing for a negotiated settlement with the SPLM/A. The new
regime also purged the civil service of secularists and leftists. It dismissed
thousands ofjudges, teachers and university professors and replaced them with
supporters. The domination ofthe NIF in the new regime became apparent as
many of its radical members and close associates were assigned to head major
government and financial institutions. Within a year or so, declaring that "there
can be no secular government in Sudan (The New Yorker, 28 May 1990: 27) and
"there will never be a political party in Sudan from now on" (Lesch, 1989: 36),
the regime reintroduced the Shari'a Laws and moved to make Sudan an Islamic
state, and in so doing, further widened the gulf between the government and
the SPLM/A. In 1990 army officers carried out a coup to overthrow the new
regime. The attempt failed and the coup leaders were executed.
The new Islamic regime paused for a short period to regroup and rearm
before it launched a series of offensive military operations against the SPLM/
A. It obtained new weapons from Iran and Libya (both supplied jet fighters used
to bomb civilians in the South). Iran also paid for Chinese light weapons,
ammunitions, tanks and artillery shells. With fresh supplies of sophisticated
military weapons and using local Arab militias as a proxy army, its armed forces
achieved major victories during 1992, and regained nearly all the garrison towns
they had lost in previous encounters. This offensive campaign was accompanied
byaerial bombardmentswhich targeted innocent civilian populations. Internecine
battles within the SPLM/A may have also contributed to the government
forces' battlefield successes.
Encouraged by these and subsequent successes in the war front as well
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as by the fracturing ofthe SPLM/A, the Islamic regime now believes that it has
the military capacity to win the war outright, and has turned the conflict into
a "jihad" or "holy war" against the southern "godless infidels," the Dinka being
the prime target. Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, the NIF's leader, has formed a
"volunteer" civilian Popular Defense Force (PDF) to fight alongside the army.
The PDF recruits young people-including university students and lecturers,
doctors, engineers, and other professionals and government employees-who
believe that they are waging a religious war against the infidel and fighting to
"defend Islam." The law requires all students to complete a period of military
service in the PDF before they are admitted to higher educational institutions.
They receive rudimentary military training for three to six months and religious
indoctrination. An estimated 400,000 young men and women have completed
training for the militia force. These fanatics-who prefer to be called M ujahideen,
holy Muslim warriors-are perishing in large numbers at the hands of the
equally determined guerrilla forces ofthe SPLM/A and other splinter groups.
The civil war, which seemed so remote in the past, is now brought home to
Khartoum.
The regime is attempting to dunce the northern Sudanese public as to
the true nature of the war through relentless barrage of daily propaganda. It
presents the war as one ofa sinister international plot against Islam and the unity
ofSudan. The southern rebels are falsely portrayed as enemies ofIslam who have
resorted to burning mosques, killing innocent Muslims, and destroying Qur'anic
schools and other religious establishments. In a recent religious decree the
government called for jihad or holy war against these so-called foreign
supported internal enemies of Islam and Sudan. In February 1995, the
government ordered each ofthe 26 provinces to produce 30,000 PDF troops.
This should result in an additional PDF force of over half a million whose job
is going to be, in the words ofAl-Beshir, to "defend our fatherland and impose
fear to our enemies," and to "liberate" the south from the SPLM/A. (Hulsman,
1995).
The ruling NIF government's violation ofpolitical and civil rights is not
confined to the non-Muslim region ofthe South. The regime is also waging war
against Muslim minorities in the North. The latest victims are the Beja, a tribe
of about 1.5 million. They are traditionally pastoral people whose territory
spreads over 100,000 square miles in the extreme northeastern Sudan. The Beja
are Muslims, but practice a more tolerant Islam blended with their traditional
beliefs. Whereas some Beja clans support the Khartoum government's attempt
to impose Islamic law on the country, many others including the Hadendawa
clans do not. Those critical of the government and unwilling to share NIF's
religious and political ideology are routinely harassed or brutally ill-treated. The
government confiscates tribal land and cattle from those opposed to it and
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hands them over to its supporters. In so doing, it has forced tens of thousands
of Beja to flee into neighboring Eritrea. As a result, a new Beja insurgency
guerrilla force operating in the northeast has emerged.
The Nuba nation is also another victim of Khartoum's excessive
political suppression. The Nuba live in the mountainous areas ofcentral Sudan,
South Kordofan Province. They are sedentary agriculturalists and cattle-
breeders. Their number in 1994 was estimated at about 1.5 million. Whereas
the majority of the Nuba are Muslims, there are many who are adherents of
Christianity and different traditional religions. The Nuba belong to more than
fifty sub-tribes and speak an equal number of languages. They are mostly
distinguished from the Arab speaking peoples surrounding them by their
distinct languages and dark color oftheir skin. The troubles for the Nuba started
under the regime ofSadiq Al-Mahdi, who became Prime Minister from 1986
to 1989. The Al-Mahdi government supplied arms to two Arab nomadic
pastoralist tribes, the Baggara and the Mazaria, who live in proximity to the
Nuba. The government's intention was that the nomads would use the arms to
fight the SPLM/A rebels. Instead, the Arab nomads used the arms against the
Nuba to settle old accounts. In the late 1980s, the SPLM/A came to the help
the Nuba and expanded its guerrilla activities in the Nuba country. Thousands
ofyoung Nuba joined the ranks ofthe SPLM/A guerrilla force. As SPLM/A's
activities became more active, the Nuba became the targets ofthe government's
Popular Defense Forces and the regular Sudanese army. In the last four years
or so, the government forces are reported to have destroyed thousands ofNuba
villages, confiscated agricultural lands and livestock, and forced the majority of
the Nuba nation to live in what the Khartoum regime euphemistically calls
"peace camps" (Hulsman, 1995). The government does not respect the
religious freedom of non-Muslims in these camps. Children are given Arabic
names and tribal identities and are subjected to a mandatory Islamic religious
education. The government also forcibly drafts underage children, without any
notice to their families, to fight against their fellow southerners.
Making Enemies Everywhere
The NIF government's continued attempt to enforce Islamic ortho-
doxy on Sudan's diversity, massive human rights violations against its citizens,
and destabilization activities against its neighbors have isolated the country
internationally. Sudan is on a list of seven countries that the US State
Department contends are sponsors ofintentional terrorism. The US considers
Sudan second only to Iran as a staging ground for international terrorism (even
though it produced no firm evidence to support its allegation) and for the
presence of Islamic extremists involved in subverting neighboring, pro-US
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states, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia, pillars of Western influence in the
Middle East. The US cut offaid to Sudan and in February 1995 pulled out its
diplomats from the embassy in Khartoum. It has also opposedWorld Bank loans
to Sudan. Up until the late 1980s, Sudan had been one of the largest
beneficiaries of economic and military aid in Mrica. During the Cold War
period, the United States spent $15 billion securing the allegiance ofSudanese
governments (Weiner, 1996: 1). Britain also expelled a number of Sudanese
diplomats, citing Sudan's complicity with acts ofinternational terrorism. Sudan
has been accused of aiding Islamic extremists in their attempt to assassinate
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak shortly after he arrived in the Ethiopian
capital in June 1995 to attend the annual summit ofthe Organization ofMrican
Unity. Even though Sudan denied any involvement in the assassination attempt
or harboring the suspects, the United Nations demanded that Sudan extradite
to Ethiopia three people suspected in the assassination attempt. In April 1996,
the UN Security Council imposed diplomatic and travel sanctions on Sudan for
its refusal to hand over the three suspects. The United States plans to seek
further United Nations sanctions against Sudan because of its alleged support
of terrorism. Soon after she took office in January 1997, the new US Secretary
ofState Madeleine Albright told the press that the US "will continue to insist
that Sudan desist from supporting terrorist activities and will be followed up in
New York to try to get additional sanctions."
Sudan shares a 7,687 kilometer borderline with its neighbors. It is
bordered by Egypt and Libya in the north, Eritrea and Ethiopia in the east,
Kenya, Uganda and Zaire, in the south, and Chad and Central Mrican Republic
in the west. The current regime's dream of expanding its versions of Islamic
orthodoxy throughout the region has enraged almost all its neighbors except
Libya. In the last couple of years Sudan came dangerously close to war with
some of these neighbors. Many of its neighbors have openly labeled it as the
main obstacle of stability in the region. At the OAU meeting held in Addis
Ababa in December 1995, 16 foreign ministers asked the Sudan government
to "desist from engaging in activities of assisting, supporting and facilitating
terrorist activities and from giving shelter and sanctuaries to terrorist elements"
(Africa Confidential, 1996: 1).
Egypt
The relationship between Egypt and Sudan goes back several centuries.
But this relation was unequal. Egypt, which is more populous and politically
better organized, has dominated Sudan for most of the past four centuries. In
the early nineteenth century Egypt controlled most of the northern half of
today's Sudan. Egyptian merchants penetrated southern Sudan to extract
slaves, and Cairo was a major market for slaves until the British abolished slavery
in 1880s. Until 1956, Britain and Egypt ruled Sudan in conjunction, even
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though the latter acted as a junior partner. Egypt had wished that the Sudanese
would unite with Egypt upon independence. Although many northern Sudanese
were sympathetic to the idea of unity, the majority of Sudanese opted for
independence. Since independence, successive Sudanese governments pur-
sued, with varying degrees, pro- Egypt foreign policies and cultivated closer
economic ties. Former president Nimeiri, who ruled Sudan from 1969 to 1985,
was Egypt's best and most reliable partner. He signed a treaty offriendship with
Egypt and became the only Arab leader to give full backing to President Sadat's
peace accord with Israel. With the overthrow ofNimeiri, however, the relation
between the two nations entered an era ofuncertainty. Sadiq al-Mahdi, Sudan's
elected Prime Minister from 1986 to 1989, froze Nimeiri's treaty offriendship
with Egypt and established closer ties with Libya, Egypt's foe.
Relations between them deteriorated further over the past seven years,
especially after the NIF regime took power in Khartoum by overthrowing
Mahdi through a military coup in 1989. The two countries found themselves
in opposite camps during the 1990-91 GulfWar. Egypt accused the Sudanese
government of backing Muslim militants trying to topple Arab and non-Arab
governments in the region by means of violence. It also charged Sudan with
backing an Egyptian Islamic extremist group, al-Gamaa al-Islamiya, in its
attempt to assassinate its President. Egypt says that not only did the Sudanese
government help in the assassination attempt, but it did also allow Egyptian
Muslim militants to use its soil for training and as a conduit for arms. Soon after
the attempt on Mubarek's life, Sudanese and Egyptian border police skirmished
in the Hala'ib Triangle, a vast barren area of20,580 square kilometers near the
Red Sea coast. The Hala'ib Triangle, which is now under Egyptian control but
claimed by Sudan, is a potentially oil-rich desert zone. In fact, in 1990, the NIF
government had granted a Canadian oil company exploration rights in the
triangle, an agreement which Egypt discarded. The area is occupied by about
20,000 al-Basharya and Ababda nomadic tribes who move free between Sudan
and Egypt. The Sudanese-Egyptian dispute over Hala'ib has festered since
1956, and has regularly surfaced whenever political relations between the two
countries deteriorated. Egypt now has full control of the area by forcefully
removing Sudanese policemen who jointly guarded a number of check points
in the disputed border area. Sudan has vowed to go to war with Egypt to reclaim
the disputed territory. It is, however, unlikely that it will do so for its poorly
trained, equipped and war-tired army force ofl15,000 is no match for Egypt's
440,000 active troops and 250,000 reserves, the largest military force in Mrica.
The Egyptian government wants to see the current leaders in Khartoum
removed from power. It supports the efforts by the Sudanese opposition groups
to force the Khartoum regime out of power. It has permitted Sudanese
dissidents in exile to wage a propaganda war against the regime. Egypt,
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however, does not want to see Sudan disintegrate into several political entities.
Whereas it has in the past urged the northern Sudanese elites to accommodate
southerners' political and economic interests, it is opposed to the southerners'
call for self-determination that leads to complete secession from the North.
Egypt sees the secession of the South as a potential threat to its vital
interest in the Nile's water. Egypt's whole civilization and modernization is
based on the merciful waters ofthe Nile and the fertile silt they bring along with
them. Over the last half century, Egypt and Sudan have maintained close
cooperation in utilizing the waters of the Nile. The 1959 Nile Waters Agree-
ment between the two countries, which allowed Egypt the construction ofthe
Aswan High Dam, allocated 75 percent ofthe annual Nile waters to Egypt and
25 percent to Sudan. In the 1970s, the two countries agreed to construct a
bypass around the Sudd in southern Sudan in order to reduce evaporation losses
and thereby to increase water yields downstream. The project, when completed,
would have benefited Egypt more since Sudan is not yet utilizing its full
allocation under the Nile Waters Agreement. Recently Egypt has launched an
ambitious plan to make the Western Desert bloom with water channeled from
the River Nile. According to the plan, a 200-mile canal will be built across the
Western Desert to irrigate about 500,000 acres (200,000 hectares) ofland and
the newly irrigated land will be populated by hundreds ofthousands ofpeople.
The water withdrawal for this plan will certainly surpass the limit imposed by the
1959 Nile Waters Agreement. Hence, one would assume that Egypt is hoping
that more water would be available with improved cooperation with its
upstream riparian neighbors, Sudan and Ethiopia. In this regard, Egypt views
the control of part of the Nile by yet another independent, upper-riparian
state-in this case southern Sudan-as a potential threat to its very survival.
Egypt fears that the extensive use ofthe Nile in an independent southern Sudan
may significantly reduce its share of the Nile waters. A united Sudan is thus in
the best interest of Egypt, and that is why it has publicly registered its
disapproval of the U.N. Security council's threat to impose an international
arms embargo on Sudan. Past and present rulers ofSudan also know that Egypt
will be on their side if the territorial integrity ofthe country is threatened. And
that why, in spite of the rocky relationship between the two countries, the
Khartoum regime recently, in January 1997, asked Egypt for military and
financial help to fight against its opponents and their alleged neighboring
supporters. Egypt, however, declined, saying the conflict in Sudan is mainly
domestic and the Sudanese government is trying to disguise the conflict as
foreign intervention. As President Mubarak put it: "The truth is there is no
Eritrean or Ethiopian attack or any foreign attack.... No [foreign force] has
entered Sudanese territory."
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Eritrea
Sudan used to have good relations with the former Eritrean People's
Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) during most
of the fronts' three decade ofstruggle for independence from Ethiopia. Sudan
provided the fronts bases and logistical facilities and allowed them to establish
representative offices on its territory. Sudan not only gave the liberation forces
easy passage back and forth across borders, but it also permitted the transship-
ment of weapons and other military supplies freely through its territory into
areas controlled by the two liberation fronts in Eritrea. The EPLF and ELF
leaders were treated as V.I.P. and were allowed to play significant roles in the
lives of their respective refugees living in Sudan. Sudan provided a home for
hundreds of thousands ofEritrean refugees during their struggle for indepen-
delKe. The exodus of Eritreans into Sudan in large numbers began in the late
1960s following the outbreak of war between the Ethiopian Army and ELF
guerrilla forces. Lowland Muslim Eritreans were the first victims ofgovernment
military attacks, and as a result, thousands of people left their homes to seek
refuge in eastern Sudan. The military regime that took power in the aftermath
ofthe 1974 revolution exacerbated the situation by intensifYing the war. In the
late 1970s and early 1980s, the Ethiopian regime launched a series ofextensive
military counter-insurgency operations, which led to the additional mass
exodus of tens of thousands of highland Christian Eritreans. The fratricidal
struggle in 1970s and early 1980s between the Muslim-dominated ELF and the
Christian-dominated EPLF also contributed to the growth ofEritrean refugees
in Sudan. In 1991, there were over 500,000 Eritrean refugees in Sudan. Most
ofthese refugees were self-settled among the local Sudanese communities in the
eastern region and received very little assistance from the international refugee
support system. Through voluntary self-repatriation and under a series of
refugee return pilot programs overseen by the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees, only about 104,000 refugees have gone back since Eritrea
gained its independence in 1991 (Kibreab, 1996: 14). The remaining 400,000
or so refugees still live in Sudan, awaiting repatriation. Whereas some of these
refugees are dispersed among the Sudanese population, most are settled in
villages and small towns between Gedarefand Kassala, near the Eritrean border.
Repatriation of refugees has been low, especially given the fact that
many Eritreans in Sudan have been anxiously waiting for the day when they can
go back to their homes and regain the confidence and dignity they lost along
with their independence during their exile. Most still want to repatriate but are
unwilling to do so until their economic well-being is guaranteed upon return.
The new Eritrean government is discouraging mass repatriation declaring its
inability to shoulder the burden of caring for, maintaining, and resettling
returnees. The amount of assistance received from the international donor
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community, including the UNHCR, has been woefully inadequate.
Many refugees are also reluctant to go back home for political reasons.
A large proportion ofthe refugees who still remain in Sudan are Muslim lowland
Eritreans. They constituted a strong social base for the ELF during the
independence struggle and were not particularly well-disposed towards the
EPLF. Even though some ex-ELF Muslim leaders and their supporters joined
the victorious EPLF-led provisional government in 1991, many were not
willing to return home, charging the new leaders of independent Eritrea as
being pro-Christian highlanders and spiteful to the interest ofMuslim lowlanders.
Relations between the NIF regime in Khartoum and the newly
independent regime in Eritrea were initially good. Sudan was the first nation to
recognize independent Eritrea immediately after the EPLF captured the last
remaining Ethiopian Army-held cities ofAsmara and Assab. It also closed the
offices ofEritrean opposition forces in its territory, upon the EPLF's demand.
Sudan even acted jointly with EPLF military authorities "in hunting down,
arresting, and kidnapping members of the Eritrean opposition organizations"
(Medhanie, 1994: 94). In return, in the early 1990s, the EPLF government
troops assisted the Sudanese army in its attack against SPLM/A forces in the
eastern border region inside Sudanese territory. But the relationship later
deteriorated as the Khartoum regime created an Islamic state and attempted to
export its Islamic political ideology to its eastern neighbors, stretching all the
way to Somalia. This clashed with the securalist outlook of the leaders now in
power in Eritrean who come from the traditionally Coptic Christian areas of
highland Eritrea and northern Tigray. The new leaders are especially worried
about the growth ofpolitical Islam among their significant Muslim populations
inhabiting the western and northern lowlands abutting Sudan. At present,
Eritrea is in the processes of drafting a permanent constitution which will
prohibit the formation of religious- or ethnic-based political parties.
The regime in Khartoum expected that the liberation front it has
supported to gain its independence would reciprocate that support by pursuing
foreign policies ofits liking. That was not meant to be. The new Eritrean leaders
pursued an 'independent' foreign policy which Sudan deemed unacceptable.
Sudan, for instance, was incensed by and suspicious of the military training
assistance Eritrea received from Egypt and Israel, the latter considered the
enemy ofIslam by the Khartoum regime. In February 1993, the diplomatic
representation of Israel in Eritrea was upgraded to an ambassador level, and
there were reports that Israel was allowed to establish military base on Eritrea's
Dahlak islands (Medhanie, 1994: 45). Israel "sees Eritrea as part of a bulwark
against Islamic fundamentalism" (Lycett, 1993: 17). In May 1994, The Wall
Street Journal revealed the increasing US-Eritrean military and economic
relations. In a front-page article on Eritrea, the journal wrote: "US Navy ships
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are making port visits, and major oil companies are negotiating exploration
deals. The US military is in advanced talks on installing powerful over-the-
horizon radar in Eritrea that would allow monitoring ofthe region as far as Iran"
(Brooks, 1994: 1). This development was quite unsettling to Sudan. Eritrea also
received loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF); Sudan is faced with the threat ofexpulsion from the IMF for failing to
pay its arrears. Eritrea obtained substantial funds from Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, and
Saudi Arabia, countries with which Sudan is at odds, to finance a major energy
project. Eritrea's close bilateral relationship with Uganda, which Sudan accuses
of supporting the SPLM/A, was also resented by the Khartoum regime.
After Eritrean formal independence in 1993, the Sudanese regime
started recruiting disenchanted Eritrean Muslim refugees and incorporated
them into an insurgent organization called the Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ).
Since the late 1993, the EIJ, trained and armed by the Khartoum regime, has
been mounting repeated terrorist attacks in western Eritrea, killing many
civilians. Throughout 1994, the Eritrean government participated in a series of
negotiations with Sudan but failed to sway the Khartoum regime to stop
sheltering and arming the EIJ. Being confronted with continuing infiltration
and guerrilla attacks, the Eritrean regime decided to sever all diplomatic ties
with Sudan in December 1994 and to openly support armed Sudanese
opposition against the NIF government in Khartoum. The Eritrean president,
Isayas Afewerki, is unequivocal about his aim to overthrow the NIF regime. In
June 1995 and January 1996, Eritrea hosted meetings that brought together
northern Sudanese political opposition groups in exile (which jointly formed
the National Democratic Alliance) with the southern rebel SPLM/A-main-
stream. Eritrea has also handed the Sudanese embassy building in Asmara over
to the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) to use as its headquarters. The
Sudanese opposition in exile has set up military training camps in Eritrea close
to the Sudanese border.
Ethiopia
Relations between Sudan and Ethiopia have been strained for quite
some time. Ethiopia has always been unhappy with the Khartoum regimes'
support ofEritrean and Tigrean liberation movements against it in all manners.
In the 1980s, the regime of Colonel Mengistu started to publicly provide
military aid and bases to the Sudan People's Liberation Army in what was
considered as a tit-for-tat foreign policy decision. With the independence of
Eritrea in 1991 and the eviction ofthe SPLM/A from Ethiopian soil, relations
between the two countries seemed to move in a more positive direction.
However, recent events have led tensions to surface once again between these
two neighboring states.
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In spite of their rocky relations in the past, Sudan and Ethiopia have
always been generous to the other's citizens who sought refuge in their
territory. In the late 1970s and 1980s, civil war, famine, and fear of political
persecution forced over a million Ethiopians to seek refuge in Sudan. Sudan
never tried to stop these refugees at its borders, even though it would have been
nearly an impossible task to protect the 1,600 kilometers (1,000 miles) border
it shares with Ethiopia even ifit had wished to do so. Whereas the majority of
these refugees were settled in rural settlements near the border region, quite a
large number of them moved to Sudanese cities and competed for scarce jobs
with the nationals. Although those refugees settled in the rural areas received
some international humanitarian assistance, they had to compete with the
native population for basic necessities: land, water, wood for fuel and construc-
tion, health and other social services.
Likewise, Ethiopia gave refuge to hundreds of thousands Southern
Sudanese refugees. During the first civil war in Sudan (1955-1972), Ethiopia
offered unstinting support to tens ofthousands ofSouthern Sudanese. Almost
all returned home after the Addis Ababa peace accord in 1972 between
northern and southern Sudan, mediated by the good office ofthe late Emperor
Haile Sellassie. Certainly the Emperor had hoped to gain some benefit from
peace in Sudan, such as the suppression of anti-Ethiopian Eritrean liberation
forces in Sudan. That was not meant to happen, however. The second civil war
that resumed in 1983 brought into Ethiopia nearly haIfa million refugees in the
late 1980s. Mter the demise of the Marxist regime of Colonel Mengistu Haile
Mariam in May 1991, the new Ethiopian government, unfortunately, forced
these refugees to go back to the hell they left behind. Tens ofthousands ofthese
refugees died for lat:k offood during their arduous journey back to their home
territory.
In the last three years or so, relations between the two nations have
deteriorated. Ethiopia has accused Sudan of sheltering three Islamic terrorists
involved in an abortive attempt to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak during an official visit to Addis Ababa in June 1995. Sudan has also
counter-accused Ethiopia, amongst others, of interfering in its internal affairs
by aiding John Garang's SPLMjA-mainstream. Ethiopia's recent announce-
ment of its plans to build two dams on the Blue Nile and the Atbara River-
major tributaries of the Nile-has also driven the two countries apart.
Uganda
Uganda cut off diplomatic relations with Khartoum in April 1995,
accusing Sudan of supporting rebels of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a
fundamentalist Christian cult group that opposes the Kampala government.
Although the LRA rebels claim to be fighting to oust President Yoweri
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Museveni, they have little support among the Ancholi people in northern
Uganda. Their war consists mainly of killing civilians and sowing terror in the
countryside in an effort to destabilize the Museveni government. The group
survives mostly on the charity of neighboring Sudan, which arms them to
retaliate against Uganda for supporting southern Sudanese rebel groups. Sudan
is also backing Muslim-based rebels of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)
against the Museveni regime operating in western Uganda. Fighting between
the ADF and the Ugandan Army has displaced more than 30,000 people many
ofwhom have fled to the neighboring Democratic Republic ofthe Congo. The
relation between the two countries worsened when both exchanged long range
artillery fire across their borders at various times in 1996 and 1977. In the past
both Sudan and Uganda had hosted tens of thousands of refugees coming
across their long international border. During the first civil war in Sudan, many
Equatorians were able to flee to the safety ofrelated tribes in northern Uganda.
Some Equatorians even served in Idi Amin's army and administration. Many
Ugandans were also able to find refuge in Southern Sudan during Amin's reign
ofterror. Currently Uganda shelters over 200,000 southern Sudanese refugees.
The civil war is spreading to northern Sudan. In November 1996, the
National Democratic Alliance (NDA), a coalition of northern opposition
groups including the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the Umma Party, the
Democratic Federal Alliance parties, the Sudan Alliance Forces (SAP), the Beja
Congress Forces and the Legal Leadership, which opened a northern front
operating out of Eritrea, joined the main faction of the SPLM/A led by John
Garang to coordinate military operations to topple the National Islamic Front
regime. The forces that make up the northern front are former soldiers who
were dismissed from the Sudan Armed forces and replaced by NIF supporters.
Garang who has been appointed as the chairman of the opposition military
command has vowed that the northeast front will cut the road connecting the
Red Sea port of Port Sudan to Khartoum, cutting off the capital from Sudan's
only port.
Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda are backing the opposition forces, and
the United States' recent decision to strengthen the military capability ofthese
front-line states has opened the way for arms supply to the SPLM/A and to
northern opposition forces (Ottaway, 1996: A34.). All the three neighboring
states are supporting the SPLM/A and tens of thousands of rebels from
southern Sudan are based in their territories. Even though they deny claims by
Khartoum that they are taking part in the fighting, these neighboring states
make no secret of their enmity toward the Islamic rulers ofSudan. The United
States administration believes that the regime in Khartoum is weak, and putting
more pressure through the opposition and neighboring states will cause the
regime to fall under its own weight.
26
Contributions in Black Studies, Vol. 15 [1997], Art. 3
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cibs/vol15/iss1/3
2. Sudan: The North-South Conflict
-----
41
The northern opposition coalition groups are calling for intifadh
(popular uprising) to remove the regime from power, hoping that history will
repeat itself. In the past, intifadh has overthrown two unpopular Sudanese
governments, the regimes of General Ibrahim Aboud (1964) and President
Jaafar Nimeiri (1985). The intifadhthat brought down these regimes was based
on well organized clandestine organization by trade associations and profes-
sional societies. This strategy may not, however, work this time because of the
omnipresence of NIP's vigilante groups called Islamic Security.
Whether external pressure will help bring the collapse ofthe regime in
Khartoum remains to be seen. But the United States government's decision to
send military equipment to the opposition fighting groups (especially the
SPLM/A-mainstream and the Sudanese Allied Forces) through the front-line
states will undoubtedly escalate the civil war. It will result in more death,
destruction, and displacement. It may also lead to the disintegration of the
country.
Conclusion
Sudan has had a tumultuous existence ever since it became a sovereign
political entity in 1956. Like the rest of the African states, Sudan's emergence
as a political unit is a product ofhistorical happenstance. It came into being not
through the processes ofits own internal dynamics and the predisposition ofits
peoples. The diverse nationalities that make up Sudan were forced by colonial
powers to coalesce into the Sudanese nation-state. The northern Arab elites that
have ruled the country for four decades failed to pursue an inclusive national
strategy which fosters equality for all citizens in the political, economic, and
cultural life of their country.
Eight years after overthrowing the elected government of Sadiq al-
Mahdi in a military coup, the NIF regime remains persistent in its attempt to
make Sudan a fundamentalist Islamic state with virtually no regard for the more
than 8 million or so Sudanese who neither profess Islam nor speak Arabic. The
regime believes in keeping Sudan as a unitary state by force as well as by
preaching the virtues ofIslam and Arabism to the country's 30 million people,
one of the most ethnically, linguistically, and geographically diverse popula-
tions on the continent. For the regime, the enforcement of the Shari'a Law is
non-negotiable. On the other hand, the southern people-despite political
difficulties-are equally determined in their liberation struggle, which the
regime in Khartoum fails to understand. The vast majority ofthe population of
the South have no trust and confidence in northern rulers who time and again
failed to promote unity among the people they govern on the basis ofequality,
respect, and shared interests.
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The NIF government-despite its lack of military success, growing
international isolation, the burden ofa staggering debt, and the economy that
has hit rock-bottom-is unwilling to compromise to end the war that has lasted
almost three decades. Nor has it been able to defeat even a divided SPLM/A,
in spite ofits "everything-for-the-war" policy which is costing the country over
$2 million a day. The regime has been reluctant or incapable to put a peace
proposal on the negotiating table that would interest the SPLM/A. All attempts
at mediation have thus far failed. Several unsuccessful attempts have been made
by the SPLM/A for a peaceful resolution ofthe conflict. For instance, the two
sides conducted peace talks in Nairobi and Addis Ababa (1989) and Abuja
(1992 and 1993). Throughout 1994 mediators from the Intergovernmental
Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), consisting of representa-
tives from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, attempted to negotiate a peace
agreement between the government and the SPLM/A. However, these efforts
bore no fruitlargely because ofthe government's unwillingness to compromise.
It seemed the parties were willing to meet only to restate their position, not to
give and take. Two ofthe most sticky issues are the question ofself-determina-
tion and Shari'a laws. The government insists that self-determination not be a
principle upon which the negotiations are based and Shari'a laws are non-
negotiable. On the other hand, the SPLM/A views the principle as inalienable
right and insists that it be included in the peace talks. It also demands that the
future status ofthe Shari'a laws be discussed in the peace negotiations. The third
round of IGADD-sponsored talks broke down, when the mediators, siding
with the SPLM/A, called for a secular Sudan and a referendum for the South
on the issue of independence.
The northern political elites as a whole appear to be divided or unsure
as to what to do with the South. Hassan al-Turabi and his NIF supporters who
occupy key military and political posts insist that the South must stay with the
North and be Islamized by whatever means necessary including the use ofbrute
forces. They believe that the North has a moral responsibility to Islamize the
South and reverse the colonial legacy ofChristian influence in the region. They
argue that if southerners are willing to convert to Christianity, a colonial
religion, they could easily accept Islam, which has strong roots in Africa. Turabi
himselfrecently told the Reuters News Agency that he and his followers "want
to plant a new civilization in the South." The head of the National Congress,
who is in charge of grassroots efforts in Islamizing the country, also declared:
"Ultimately, people in southern Sudan will totally accept Islam and will even
claim Arab ancestry" (Shadid, 1996: 3). Hence, this group is bent on making
the whole Sudan a fundamentalist Islamic state with virtually no regard to the
eight million or so Sudanese who neither profess Islam nor speak Arabic. By
trying to instill Islamic orthodoxy amid diversity, this extremist group seems to
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have chosen the path of disintegration rather than coexistence.
On the other hand, there are some who favor the secession ofthe South
so that an Islamic republic can be established in the predominantly "Arab" and
Islamic North with less difficulty and controversy. They see no reason why the
Muslim majority ought to accede a fundamental religious prescript to appease
the non-Muslim minority. Some even admit that imposing an Islamic consti-
tution on the whole country will result in discrimination against the peoples of
the country in their civil rights and citizenship obligations. They also argue that
the sooner the secession takes place, the less killing will occur. There are also
others, perhaps a vast majority, who advocate peaceful coexistence with other
faiths without imposing Islamic law on the whole country. They favor a secular
and a decentralized state.
At present, those who wish to pursue the war-that is, Bashir, Turabi and
their followers-have the upper hand. They have opted to intensifY the war with
bombing raids to terrorize the inhabitants of the South and to demoralize the
SPLM/A-Mainstream. The government's bombing raid during the last two
dry-season offensives have killed hundreds of people and displaced several
thousands-over 100,000 people in Aswa, Arne and Atepi and 250,000 people
in and around Mundiri in Western Bahr el Ghazal in 1994 alone. (Africa
Confidential, 1994:3). On their part, the SPLM/A fighters-despite political
difficulties-are fighting back hard and have made it virtually impossible for the
government troops to penetrate the countryside and to bring in crucial supplies
(fuel, munitions, and food). Unable to get to enemy territories, the government
has now resorted to indiscriminate bombing ofcivilian areas and is carrying out
a scorched-earth campaign in a struggle it has termed a "jihad," or holy war.
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